

CHAPTER 18**CONTENTS****TERRORISM/WMD**

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OVERVIEW

The events of September 11, 2001 weakened the public's confidence in the government's ability to protect our homeland from a terrorist attack. While international terrorism is principally a federal responsibility, in light of new realities, **states must do more** to prepare to combat all types of terrorism. Therefore Florida's governmental leaders took immediate steps to ensure this state is safe from and prepared to respond in the event of a terrorist attack.

Accordingly, on September 14, 2001, Governor Jeb Bush formally directed the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) and the Florida Division of Emergency Management (FDEM) to immediately complete a comprehensive assessment of Florida's capability to prevent, mitigate and respond to a terrorist attack.

Terrorism, as defined in Chapter 775.30, Florida Statutes, is an activity that:

- (1) (a) Involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life which is a violation of the criminal laws of this state or of the United States; or
- (b) Involves a violation of s. 815.06, Offenses against computer users; and
- (2) Is intended to:
 - (a) Intimidate, injure, or coerce a civilian population;
 - (b) Influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;
 - (c) Affect the conduct of government through destruction of property, assassination, murder, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy.

A terrorist incident can affect property, critical infrastructure, single or multiple victims, or any combination of of these. Due to the complexity of such an incident it is imperative that first responders implement the National Incident Management System (NIMS).

While an Incident Command System is used to manage scenes every day, the complexity of a terrorist event will demand the implementation of a Unified Command soon after the arrival of first responders. When the magnitude of an incident exceeds the capabilities and resources of the

local responders, the ICS command function can readily develop into a Unified Command system. Such a system will provide a comprehensive and unified response to meet the unique requirements of each incident.

It should be understood that a terrorism attack could be instituted in many formats. Whether it is biological, nuclear, chemical, and explosive or by other means, one of the main goals will be to cause confusion and disruption. It is incumbent upon responders to have a plan of action in place that is practical and has been practiced to minimize the effects of confusion and disruption, and to reduce the loss of lives and property.

As applicable, responders should consult Chapter (13) Hazardous Material, (19) Law Enforcement, and Chapter (14) Multi-Casualty Branch of the Florida Field Operating Guide when a terrorist incident precipitates a hazardous materials release and/or a mass casualty incident.

Responders should be acutely aware of the unique nature of a terrorism incident. A major response may involve responders from multiple agencies at the local, state and federal levels. To ensure coordination, all responding agencies must operate as one Unified Command. Outside assistance may originate from local, regional, state, and federal agencies.

PRIMARY AGENCIES

Local Response (Unified Command):

On a local level, the agency having jurisdiction will have the immediate authority for establishing Command. All responding agencies have the responsibility of becoming part of that Command System and expanding it as the magnitude of the response grows. This modular approach to management will fit any incident.

Regional Response (Regional Domestic Security Task Force, RDSTF):

Pursuant to F.S. 943.0312, the FDLE has established a RDSTF in each of the seven operational regions of the department. Co-chairs head each RDSTF, one of whom is a Sheriff and the other is the FDLE Special Agent in Charge. Within each task force, will be appointed sub-committee chairs

for the specific disciplines outlined in this document. The RDSTFs address the unique prevention and response needs for terrorism and WMD incidents. The RDSTFs are the mechanism by which the Commissioner of FDLE coordinates prevention and initial response activities.

Regional Operations Center (ROC):

FDLE has a major regional office within each of the seven regions of the state. Each of these centers is capable of establishing limited operational coordination.

State Command:

State Command is an expansion of the incident command function primarily designed to manage a very large and complex incident. State Command is a further definition of this expansion to include that person(s) designated by the Governor, through an Executive Order, to coordinate the determination of incident:

Operational Coordination:

The Commissioner of FDLE, as the State Incident Commander, exercises the authority to coordinate the initial response to acts of terrorism through the RDSTF(s), which provide immediate regional response in support of the local incident commander. DEM is responsible for coordinating statewide assets in support to the impacted local jurisdiction(s). Response operations support Prevention efforts from the time of attack until such time as the lead for Unified State Command transitions from the Incident Commander to the SCO, thus assuring a single integrated management structure. This response includes:

- Requesting that the RDSTF stand-up the MAC
- Coordinate initial response during the unstable escalation of post-event timelines
- Support the extended response to local incident command

State Support Resources:

1. **State Emergency Response Team (SERT):** The SERT is composed of representatives of state and local agencies that coordinate assets to Terrorist/WMD incidents. These incidents that impact Florida can quickly exceed the response and recovery capabilities of local jurisdictions. During the response phase of such events, the SERT, located at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), coordinates the deployment of state resources, personnel, interstate mutual aid, and federal resources to support local agencies. The SERT and the MAC compliment each other in a unified manner and may appear seamless in support to the Incident Commander.
2. **44th Civil Support Team (CST):** The Florida National Guard has a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civil Support Team (CST) that is designed to support local Incident Command and local emergency responders as well as provide mutual support to other WMD CST elements. The WMD CST is a National Guard unit specifically designed for rapid response to actual or suspected domestic security incidents involving use of chemical, biological or radiological materials. The CST is normally under state control and may be employed as a state asset without DOD authorization. The WMD CST is dispatched through the SWP and can initiate a full team deployment in under two hours.

The WMD CST is authorized 22 full time Army and Air National Guard personnel. The WMD CST consists of seven specific sections: command, operations, communications, administration/logistics, medical, survey, and decontamination elements. Each section has a specific mission that supports WMD CST.

3. **DEP Environmental Response Team (ERT):** The ERT is a special team consisting of DEP environmental investigators, emergency responders and uniformed officers along with representation from DOH, DOT, DACS, and the U.S. EPA Investigative Division. The team is available to support incident commanders with hazardous material issues including investigations, sampling, and disposal support. Focus is primarily on, but is not limited to, hazardous materials and industrial chemicals. Local ERT personnel can be on scene within three hours and

the full team deployed within twelve hours of notification. DEP response personnel have the training and experience to assist Forensic teams in the gathering of physical evidence in contaminated environments.

- 4 **State Laboratories:** Department of Health, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, State Fire Marshal and the Department of Environmental Protection maintain labs available to conduct a wide range of analysis functions. Each has certain expertise available to support local operations.

Federal Response:

In a CBRNE incident, if determined to be an act of terrorism, response for Federal agencies/departments will be implemented under the auspices of the National Response Plan (NRP). The NRP provides for coordination and response structures to support the local incident command using principles of ICS and the National Incident Management System (NIMS).

If warranted, the Federal Government may establish a Joint Field Office, or JFO, in response to a CBRNE incident. JFOs are temporary facilities established locally to coordinate all operational Federal response and assistance activities to jurisdictions affected by the CBRNE incident. Operating in concert with State emergency response forces, Federal response may involve deployment of specialized teams who coordinate with State agencies in responding to the incident, both in support of the local incident commander/command structure.

In a CBRNE incident, the President will usually designate a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), who is the lead Federal operations official and/or may designate a Principal Federal Official (PFO) who is the lead Federal official representing the Secretary of Homeland Security. While the PFO represents the “face of the Federal response” and the Secretary, s/he is not a response operations officer and does not “command” individual elements of the Federal response (i. e. the PFO does not tell the EPA how to contain and oil spill, or tell the SAIC how to get fingerprints, etc.).

During initial operations (pre-JFO) State/local operations data will be coordinated through the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) located in a DHS-FEMA Regional office, which shares that data with the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC). Usually, State emergency response officials coordinate and communicate directly with Federal officials in the RRCC and/or the specialized teams deployed in support of the State and the local incident command. Only in the most complex, larger incidents will direct coordination between State/locals and the HSOC occur. When the JFO is established, State coordination will be with Federal officials in that JFO, with the exception of the most complex, larger incidents.

Federal Response (Joint Information Center, JIC):

A Joint Information Center, or JIC, may be established depending upon the size, complexity, and operational needs of the incident response. When established, the JIC is staffed by local, State, Federal and/or tribal representatives for the purpose of coordinating messages and information for media/public consumption. A main objective of the JIC is to assure timely, correct and unified messages are provided; information is collected, coordinated and disseminated via a JIC.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS

The organizational charts provided in this document are based on the National Incident Management System (NIMS) accepted ICS system. However, some of the charts contain variations specifically intended for a terrorism event in Florida. The following summarizes the structure and purpose of the referenced charts:

Local Incident: (See Figure 1)


- Incident Command System (ICS) should be implemented on all incidents according to local protocols. It should be noted that responders could be faced with an incident that is not determined to be the result of a terrorist attack until well into the event.
- All agencies are encouraged to use ICS for everyday incidents. This will help jurisdictions be prepared when a terrorist event strikes.
- Unified Command: In the ICS, Unified Command is a unified team effort which allows all agencies with jurisdictional responsibility for the incident, either geographical or functional, to manage an incident by establishing a common set of incident objectives and strategies. This is accomplished without losing or abdicating agency authority, responsibility, or accountability.
- Unified Command is encouraged whenever the incident has multi-discipline, multi-jurisdictional impact.

In the following figures, Unified Command is designated by a triangle. The triangle acts as a pinwheel, allowing the triangle to rotate and place the responsible agency in the lead role.

Local Incident - Terrorist Involvement Unknown (e.g. Possible Anthrax)

Local Response Only

(Figure 1)



Any other agency can be part of what is depicted as a triangle. As an example, the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services may be the lead in the case of food contamination. In very large and complicated events there may be several disciplines represented in the command and support structure.

Regional Response (one county): (See Figure 2)


When it is determined or suspected that an incident is the result of a terrorist event, other levels of response are activated.

- Unified Command established at onset of incident.
- Local protocol should assure notification of State Warning Point (SWP).
- Early activation of the CEOC is crucial to support the response efforts of logistics and command.
- The RDSTF is notified by the SWP and by local representation on the RDSTF. The RDSTF is formally activated by a Governor's Executive Order to provide immediate regional response capability to the unified command in accordance with pre-developed regional response plans and protocols.
- Pre-planning should indicate whether locating the RDSTF at the local EOC is feasible.
- RDSTF may activate at the ROC (FDLE Regional Operations Center) depending on circumstances such as location of incident and space needs.
- CEOC and RDSTF should communicate closely to assure that Unified Command has the necessary resources to manage the consequences of the event. If not co-located, then liaisons should be provided to and from both locations.

Regional Incident - Beyond Capability of Local On-Scene Resources Terrorism/WMD Involvement Suspected or Confirmed

Regional Response

(Figure 2)




State Command Structure – Terrorist Event (See Figure 3)

The Governor has the ultimate responsibility of major disasters affecting the State of Florida.

- The Governor through an Executive Order may designate an overall State Incident Commander and a State Coordinating Officer.
- The State Command may include the designated responsibilities for Crisis Management through the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and Consequence Management through the Division of Emergency Management.
- The Governor may identify the State Health Officer as an incident commander to coordinate bio-terrorism response efforts.
- The SEOC will be activated at the appropriate level in support of State Command. All necessary Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) will be activated according to protocol.
- The JFO has the responsibility of coordinating the Federal response for the event. The size and location(s) of the incident will determine the location of the JOC.
- The CEOC may house RDSTF and JFO depending on available facilities and availability of local assets to support those entities. In all cases these entities must communicate closely to coordinate the resources needed for managing the response.


STATE COMMAND STRUCTURE



(Figure 3)

State Resource Coordination (See Figure 4)

- The State Unified Command will determine the necessity of activating the RDSTF as a MAC.
- The MAC will be mission tasked to coordinate regional resources assigned to the incident and facilitate the coordination through the requesting CEOC.
- The MAC will act as an accelerator in responding these resources to the incident, the coordination is outlined below:


(Figure 4)

Incident Contained in One County: (See Figure 6)


- An incident affecting one county may necessitate the activation of the County EOC.
- The incident may require the activation of the State EOC to an appropriate level to support local actions.
- RDSTF and JFO shall communicate closely with all affected and activated County EOC.

Incident in Multiple Counties, Single Region: (See Figure 7)

- Incident(s) affecting multiple counties will necessitate the activation of each county's EOC.
- RDSTF and JFO shall communicate closely with all affected and activated CEOC.

Incident Contained in One County

Incident in Multiple Counties




Multiple Regions and Multiple Counties: (See Figure 8)

- In the case of wide spread incidents or incidents crossing regional lines, each region must activate the appropriate RDSTF.
- Unified Command should be established to handle each scene or each geographical area affected.
- In some cases Unified Command may establish Divisions as outlined in ICS protocol to handle multiple scenes in the same jurisdictions. Local Commanders must determine which part of the ICS will best manage the event.
- It is recommended that Federal response include Federal JFO should be established in conjunction with SEOC when the incident affects a large area or multiple areas of the state.

Incident in Multiple Regions and Multiple Counties

(Figure 8)



NOTIFICATION PROCESS FOR TERRORISM/WMD INCIDENT

During any incident establishment of ICS assures that there will be an efficient management system. A terrorism/WMD incident makes the early establishment of ICS imperative.

The safety of responding personnel, as well as the citizens involved, depends on the actions of those managing the incident. Early implementation of a Unified Command System will assure that the scene is managed properly and that all agencies receive notification in a timely fashion.

Listed below is the notification protocol:

- 1. A report of an incident is received. It is important to realize that the incident may be reported as a terrorist attack when it is actually not. The opposite is also true. Units arriving at an incident must always be vigilant that the extraordinary event could be a staged attack. In any incident involving an explosion or suspected gas release, responders should always be cognitive of a potential secondary device.**
- 2. Supervisors initially arriving establish ICS and request additional resources as needed.**
- 3. Once units are on the scene and have confirmed a terrorist incident, the County Warning Point (CWP) and the local Emergency Management must be notified in accordance with local protocols.**
- 4. The appropriate County staff is notified.**
- 5. The State Warning Point (SWP) is notified.**
- 6. The SWP ensures notification of affected CWP(s). The affected County(s) may activate their EOCs to the level necessary to support the impacted jurisdiction.**

7. The SWP notifies the appropriate Emergency Support Functions (ESF) and State staff.
8. ESF 16 (Law Enforcement) will notify FDLE, the affected ROC and RDSTF.
9. The SWP notifies the appropriate Federal agencies.
10. The State Emergency Operation Center will be activated to the level necessary to assist local operations.

RESPONDERS RECOGNIZING TERRORIST EVENTS

Emergency responders may be the targets of terrorism/WMD. Early identification of a potential threat is imperative. Once a potential or actual terrorist threat or incident is identified, precautions need to be implemented immediately to ensure that responders have the tactical advantage.

Normal response patterns should be adjusted based on the following criteria.

Tools for Recognition:

Type of Facility

- Occupancy
- Symbolism/History
- Public Assembly
- Controversial facility
- Critical Infrastructure
- Critical Facility
- Vulnerable Facility

Types of Event

- Bombing or Incendiary
- Incidents involving firearms

- Non-traumatic mass casualty incident
- Epidemiological Incidents

Conditions

- Ideal attack weather conditions, little air movement, inversions, buildings, subway
- Situations that place victims in choke points

Timing of Incident

- Timed for maximum casualties
- Historic or significant dates

Other Observations

- Unusual casualty patterns or symptoms
- Odors
- Out-of-place containers or dissemination devices

Units must avoid choke points and should identify and maintain an exit from the scene.

RESPONSE AND INITIAL APPROACH FOR ALL RESPONDERS

The following are included for consideration by all responders as they respond to and/or approach a suspected act of terrorism:

Indicators

- Is the response to a terrorist target or event?
- Has there been a threat?
- Are there multiple victims of unknown illness?
- Are previous responders victims?
- Are there indications of a hazardous substance?
- Has there been an explosion?
- Has there been a secondary attack, explosion or threat?

If One Positive Indicator:

- Respond with heightened level of awareness

If Multiple Positive Indicators:

- Consider possibility of a terrorist incident
- Initiate all response actions with extreme caution
- Be alert for actions against responders
- Evaluate and implement personal protective measures
- Consider the need for maximum respiratory protection
- Assure Law Enforcement is aware of the assessment
- Response route considerations:
 - Approach cautiously, from uphill/upwind if possible
 - Consider combined approach of Law Enforcement, EMS and Fire as a Task Force
 - Avoid areas where there is no easy escape route
 - Designate an area to re-group – separate from staging
 - Identify safe staging locations for incoming units

Command Considerations:

- ❖ Establish Command.
 - First Command Officers to arrive establish Unified Command with all agencies having jurisdiction
 - Ensure common communications
 - Clear Text
- ❖ Isolate Entry
 - Responding Law Enforcement should establish Perimeter Security Group
 - Establish scene security as part of this Group
 - Deny entry to and isolate non-requested resources
 - Do not mix “not requested” resources with “known/legitimately” requested resources within the inner perimeter or near the command post
- ❖ Initiate on-scene size-up and hazard risk assessment
- ❖ Establish safe staging area early
 - Provide personnel
 - Designate location
 - Identify participants
 - Assign manager
- ❖ Establish Safety Officer

- Authority over all agencies
- Assure proper protection level for all responders
- Establish emergency egress route
- Ensure accountability system is in use
- ❖ Assess Command Post security
- ❖ Evaluate the need for additional resources
 - Implement local/regional WMD Plan
 - Request activation of the RDSTF Regional Response Plan
 - Request regional mutual aid through County EOC, for example: Regional Domestic Security Task Force Response Template, FFCA Disaster Response Plan and State Law Enforcement Mutual Aid
 - County EOC request additional necessary units from SEOC in accordance with the RDSTF Regional Response Plan
 - Assure that proper notifications have been made:
 - State Warning Point
 - Local Hospitals to receive MCI patients
 - Utilities as needed
 - Public
 - Private

On Scene Size-up

- ❖ What information was received by the Communications Center?
- ❖ What physical indicators and other outward warning signs of biological, nuclear, incendiary, chemical, and explosive events, including armed assault, exist?
- ❖ How many critical trauma victims appear to be present?
- ❖ What is the debris field?
- ❖ Is there Mass Casualty/fatality with minimal or no trauma?
- ❖ Are there any casualties among the emergency service personnel?
- ❖ Does any severe structural damage exist without an obvious cause?
- ❖ Are there dead animals and vegetation?
- ❖ Is there Critical Infrastructure system(s) disruptions (utilities, transportation, etc)?
- ❖ Are there unusual odors, color of smoke, vapor clouds?
- ❖ Do the Victims have signs and symptoms of hazardous substance exposure?

- ❖ Are there unconscious victims with no trauma?
- ❖ Are victims exhibiting SLUDGEM signs/symptoms?
- ❖ Are there victims with skin abnormalities?
- ❖ Are there a large number of victims in respiratory distress?
 - Identify apparent sign/symptom commonality
 - Interview victims and witnesses
 - Account for all victims
 - Gather information on delivery system of any agents
 - Where did it happen?
 - When did it happen?
 - Who was involved?
- ❖ Identify potential type of events(s)
 - Biological
 - Nuclear/radiological
 - Incendiary
 - Chemical
 - Explosive
 - Armed assault
 - Intentional emergency to a community's infrastructure (transportation, communication, power, public works)
- ❖ Weather considerations
 - Downwind exposures
 - Monitor forecast
 - Determine life safety threats:
 - Self
 - Responders
 - Victims
 - Public
- ❖ Determine mechanism(s) of injury (TRACEM-P)
 - Thermal
 - Radiological
 - Asphyxiant
 - Chemical
 - Etiological
 - Mechanical
 - Psychological

- ❖ Estimate number of victims
- ❖ Consider potential for secondary attack

Incident Site Management, Safety, and Security

- ❖ Re-assess initial isolation/standoff distances
 - Establish an outer perimeter
 - Establish an inner perimeter
- ❖ Initiate public protection actions
 - Remove endangered victims from high-hazard areas
 - Establish safe refuge area
 - Evacuate the threatened area
 - Protect in place
- ❖ Identify appropriate PPE levels prior to committing personnel
- ❖ Dedicate emergency medical services needed for responders
- ❖ Prepare for gross decontamination operations for responders
- ❖ Establish gross decontamination capabilities
- ❖ Coordinate with all agencies to provide security and control of perimeters
- ❖ Designate a media briefing location
- ❖ Designate an emergency evacuation signal
 - Needs to be common to ALL on scene personnel and agencies

Tactical consideration

- ❖ Life safety
 - Isolate/secure and deny entry
 - Assure public protection (evacuate/protect in place)
 - Implement self-protection measures
 - Commit only essential personnel/minimize exposure
 - Confine/contain all contaminated and exposed victims
- ❖ Rescue considerations
 - Is the scene safe for operations?
 - Can the scene be made safe to operate?
 - Are victims viable?
 - Are they ambulatory?
 - Can they self evacuate?
 - Are they contaminated?

- Do they require extrication?
- Is a search safe and possible?
- Is specialized PPE required?
- ❖ Incident stabilization
 - Does it need to be a defensive operation?
 - Water supply
 - Exposure protection
 - Utility control
 - Fire suppression
 - Haz Mat control

SPECIFIC AGENCY RELATED ACTIONS

The following are agency specific considerations as those disciplines approach an actual or suspected incident involving terrorism/WMD:

Law Enforcement

If first on scene

- ❖ Stop, Look and Listen - quickly assess situation
- ❖ Identify immediate danger zone – notify other responders
- ❖ Establish inner perimeter – contain and control
- ❖ Officer safety
 - Secondary devices
 - PPE
 - Time, distance, shielding
 - Isolate/secure scene, establish control zones (inner and outer)
- ❖ First supervisor/additional officer(s) on scene
 - Establish Incident Command and unify with all agencies having jurisdiction
 - Determine joint command post location
 - Establish personnel accountability system
 - Determine safe area and set up outer perimeter
 - Establish ingress and egress
 - Consider staging area
 - Use clear text for communications with other agencies

- Coordinate with other responding agencies
- Continue to evaluate scene
- ❖ Initiate public safety measures
 - Evacuate
 - Shelter in place
- ❖ If command has been established
 - Report to Command
 - Insure common communications
 - Institute Clear text
 - Stage incoming units
 - Notifications to State Warning Point
 - Request additional resources, as needed
 - Victim assistance/staging
 - Crime scene preservation
- ❖ Unified Command Team – assign personnel to:
 - Operations
 - Planning
 - Technical specialist
 - Safety
- ❖ Evaluate scene safety/security
 - Ongoing criminal activity
 - Consider victims to be possible terrorists
 - Consider secondary devices
 - Additional threats
 - Gather witness statements/observations and document
 - Initiate law enforcement notifications
 - Federal Bureau of Investigation
 - Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms
 - Explosive Ordinance Division
 - Request additional resources
 - Secure outer perimeter
 - Traffic control considerations
 - Staging areas
 - Entry/egress
 - Use appropriate self-protective measures
 - Time, distance and shielding

- Minimize number of personnel exposed to danger
- Proper PPE
- Initiate public safety measures
- Evacuate
- Protect in place
- Assist with control/isolation of patients

Fire/Rescue

If first on the scene

- ❖ Isolate/secure the scene, deny entry, establish control zones
- ❖ Establish Command
- ❖ First Arriving Command Officer establishes Unified Command with all agencies having jurisdiction
- ❖ Insure common communications
- ❖ Clear text
- ❖ Evaluate scene safety
- ❖ Stage incoming units
- ❖ Gather information regarding the incident, number of patients, etc.
- ❖ Assign ICS positions
- ❖ Initiate notifications
- ❖ Request additional resources
- ❖ Use appropriate self-protective measures
- ❖ Proper PPE
- ❖ Time, distance, and shielding
- ❖ Minimize number of personnel exposed to danger
- ❖ Initiate public safety measures
- ❖ Rescue
- ❖ Evacuate
- ❖ Protect in place
- ❖ Establish water supply
- ❖ Suppression activities
- ❖ Decontamination
- ❖ Control and isolate patients
- ❖ Away from hazard
- ❖ Near edge of hot/warm zone
- ❖ Begin and/or assist with triage and treatment
- ❖ Begin gross mass decontamination operations

- ❖ Prepare to begin emergency decontamination
- ❖ Evidence preservation/collection
- ❖ Recognize potential evidence
- ❖ Report findings to appropriate authority
- ❖ Consider embedded objects as possible evidence
- ❖ Secure evidence found in ambulance or at hospital
- ❖ Establish and maintain chain of custody for evidence

Emergency Medical Service/Health

If first on scene

- ❖ Isolate/secure the scene, establish control zones
- ❖ Establish Command
- ❖ First Arriving Command Officer establishes Unified Command with all agencies having jurisdiction
- ❖ Insure common communications
- ❖ Utilize Clear text
- ❖ Evaluate scene safety/security
- ❖ Stage incoming units

If command has been established


- ❖ Report to Command
- ❖ Gather information regarding
 - ❖ Type of event
 - ❖ Number of patients
 - ❖ Severity of injuries
 - ❖ Signs and symptoms
- ❖ Assign ICS positions as needed
- ❖ Notify hospitals

Initiate mass casualty procedures

- ❖ Evaluate the need for casualty collection point/patient staging area
- ❖ Control and isolate patients
- ❖ Ensure patients are decontaminated before entering cold zone
- ❖ Triage, administer antidote, treat, transport
- ❖ Evidence preservation/collection
- ❖ Recognize potential evidence
- ❖ Consider embedded objects as possible evidence

- ❖ Secure evidence found in ambulance or at hospital
- ❖ Establish and maintain chain of custody for evidence

The following depicts an integrated Unified Command structure at a full-scale Terrorism Event. The next sections will describe the elements contained within the operational branches on such an event.



UNIFIED COMMAND ORGANIZATION DEFINITIONS

TERMS	DEFINITIONS
Accountability	System designed to track responders on scene.
Asymptomatic	Victim exposed but not exhibiting symptoms.
B-NICE	Biological, Nuclear, Incendiary, Chemical, Explosive.
Casualty Collection Point (CCP)	Predefined location at which patients are collected, triaged, and provided with initial medical care.
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
CEOC	County Emergency Operations Center.
CERT	Community Emergency Response Teams.
Choke Point	Congested area that could cause response delays.
Cold Zone	Clean area outside the inner perimeter where command and support functions take place.
CST	National Guard WMD Civil Support Team.
Florida Division of Emergency Management	Florida Division of Emergency Management.
DEP	Florida Department of Environmental Protection.
DMAT	Disaster Medical Assistance Team.
DMORT	Disaster Mortuary Assistance Team.
DOD	Department of Defense.
EMS	Emergency Medical Services.
EOC	Emergency Operations Center (County Level).
EOD	Explosive Ordinance Disposal.
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency.
ESF	Emergency Support Function.

TERMS	DEFINITIONS
Federal Emergency Management Agency	Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Gross Decon	Initial decontamination to remove large amounts of agent.
DOH	Florida Department of Health.
Hot Zone	Area immediately around the incident where serious threat of harm exists. Should extend far enough to keep responders safe from effects of agents. Entry is limited to trained and properly protected personnel only.
HVAC	Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning.
ICS	Incident Command System.
Initial Response	Normal compliment responding to the incident.
Inner Perimeter	Secured inner area of operations.
JIC	Joint Information Center.
JFO	Federal Joint Field Office
Mass Decon	Decontamination process for large number of victims/responders.
Military	Florida National Guard 44 th Civil Support Team.
MMRS	Metropolitan Medical Response System.
NMRT	National Medical Response Team.
Outer Area	Outermost area from hazard that is secure.
Patient Staging Area (PSA)	Area where patients may receive continued medical treatment.
Persistent Agent	An agent that upon release retains its casualty producing effects for an extended period of time.
POC	Point of Contact.

TERMS	DEFINITIONS
Point Source	Area where agent was released or item containing agent.
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment.
Protect in Place	Method of protecting public by limiting exposure.
Rally Point	Designated area to regroup for responders. Area where resources meet and revise plan of action. Can be predetermined area in some industries.
RDSTF	Regional Domestic Security Task Force.
Reinforced Response	Response of additional units to assist on scene.
ROC	FDLE Regional Operations Center.
Safe Refuge Area	An area within the contamination reduction zone for assembling individuals. Can provide area to separate contaminated and non-contaminated persons.
SCBA	Self Contained Breathing Apparatus.
SEOC	State Emergency Operations Center.
SFM	State Fire Marshal.
SLUDGEM	Acronym for salivation, lacrimation, urination, defecation, gastric distress, emesis and miosis.
SWP	State Warning Point located in the SEOC.
Symptomatic	Victim exhibiting signs and symptoms of exposure to an agent.
Warm Zone	A buffer between hot and cold zones. Personnel in this area are removed from immediate threat but not considered completely safe from harm. Use of PPE necessary once contaminated people or equipment enter the area.
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction.